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Abstract
The design of protected areas, whether marine or terrestrial, rarely considers how people 
respond to the imposition of no-take sites with complete or incomplete enforcement. Con-
sequently, these protected areas may fail to achieve their intended goal. We present and 
solve a spatial bio-economic model in which a manager chooses the optimal location, size, 
and enforcement level of a marine protected area (MPA). This manager acts as a Stackel-
berg leader, and her choices consider villagers’ best response to the MPA in a spatial Nash 
equilibrium of fishing site and effort decisions. Relevant to lower income country settings 
but general to other settings, we incorporate limited enforcement budgets, distance costs of 
traveling to fishing sites, and labor allocation to onshore wage opportunities. The optimal 
MPA varies markedly across alternative manager goals and budget sizes, but always induce 
changes in villagers’ decisions as a function of distance, dispersal, and wage. We consider 
MPA managers with ecological conservation goals and with economic goals, and iden-
tify the shortcomings of several common manager decision rules, including those focused 
on: (1) fishery outcomes rather than broader economic goals, (2) fish stocks at MPA sites 
rather than across the full marinescape, (3) absolute levels rather than additional values, 
and (4) costless enforcement. Our results demonstrate that such naïve or overly narrow 
decision rules can lead to inefficient MPA designs that miss economic and conservation 
opportunities.
Keywords Additionality · Bio-economic model · Enforcement · Leakage · Nash 
equilibrium · No-take reserves · Park effectiveness · Reserve site selection · Spatial 
prioritization · Systematic conservation planning · Marine spatial planning
1 Introduction
Many countries are expanding their protected area (PA) networks, terrestrial and marine, to 
achieve both ecological goals, which often align with international conservation agreements 
(Pereira et al. 2013), and economic goals (Gaines et al. 2010; Jentoft et al. 2011), which often 
prioritize sustainable resource management for the benefit of nearby resource-dependent 
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communities (Cabral et al. 2019; Carr et al. 2019). However, for any of these goals, eco-
nomic efficiency requires that PA siting and management decisions anticipate and consider 
the response of potential resource extractors, especially in settings of limited enforcement 
budgets (Cabral et al. 2017). Empirical economic analyses of terrestrial park effectiveness 
often rely on von Thunen-inspired models to predict the level of deforestation that would 
occur if a location was not in a PA, and then calculate the level of “avoided deforestation” 
created by the PA as a measure of its effectiveness (e.g. Pfaff et al. 2014). Working from 
the opposite starting point, we use a model of villagers’ fishing site and labor decisions to 
predict how villagers react to a marine protected area (MPA), and incorporate these vil-
lager best responses into optimal MPA design to determine the optimal size, location, and 
enforcement of an MPA intended to maximize either ecological or economic objectives.
To predict how villagers react to an MPA, we develop a game-theoretic model in which 
villagers make individual fishing site and labor effort decisions that aggregate through a 
Nash equilibrium with spatially explicit micro-foundations. To be general to lower-income 
country settings, we explicitly model labor allocation decisions across fishing and non-
fishing income-generating activities and a fishing site choice, rather than allocating fishing 
effort until achieving rent dissipation in each fishing site (Sanchirico and Wilen 2001).1 
By modeling fixed distance costs of traveling to each potential fishing site, we incorporate 
the spatial interactions between fishers’ site choice and managers’ MPA size, sites, and 
enforcement decisions (Robinson et al. 2014; Madrigal-Ballestero et al. 2017). Specifically, 
we model biologically homogeneous fishing sites with density dispersal across sites, but 
heterogeneous distance costs induce heterogeneous returns to fishing across sites. Finally, 
acting as a Stackelberg leader and to maximize a specific goal, our manager chooses the 
optimal size, sites, and enforcement level considering villagers’ spatial equilibrium best 
responses to the MPA.
MPAs are often used for fisheries management and ecological conservation goals, 
including ecological objectives around fish populations or marine biodiversity and eco-
nomic goals around livelihood objectives and fish yields (Batista et al. 2011; Pajaro et al. 
2010; Pomeroy et al. 2005). To reflect the varied objectives for MPAs worldwide, we con-
sider two central goals: maximize income as an economic goal and maximize the avoided 
fish stock losses in the marinescape as an ecological goal. Our economic goal emphasizes a 
broad objective similar to maximizing welfare, rather than following the fishery economics 
literature’s emphasis on aggregate yield and fishery profits, because aggregate income is 
inclusive of fishery profits and onshore wage earnings.2 Our ecological goal of maximiz-
ing avoided stock losses in the marinescape corresponds with the systematic conservation 
planning literature’s emphasis on evaluating conservation policy at the landscape level and 
on the additional conservation created.3
Regardless of the manager’s goal, we consider the optimal MPA design both when a 
manager is constrained by an enforcement budget and when this constraint does not bind. 
By considering the budget-constrained managers, we can address a central issue for PAs 
1 This approach allows us to address income considerations both in fishing and outside of fishing, labor 
allocation decisions that determine fishery exit, and settings without rent dissipation, as in related work 
(Albers et al. 2020). In the cases presented in this paper, all the results lead to rent dissipation after covering 
the fixed costs of distance. We maintain Sanchirico and Wilen’s assumption that non-MPA sites (patches) 
are open-access.
2 We also consider the optimal MPAs for a yield or fishery profit maximizing goal.
3 Here, “avoided fish stock loss” is akin to the “avoided deforestation” in the terrestrial park evaluation 
literature (i.e. additionality).
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in lower-income countries: PAs without sufficient enforcement become “paper parks” 
that provide few additional PA benefits because people continue to extract resources 
(e.g. Adams et  al. 2019; Brown et  al. 2018; Bonham et  al. 2008). In our model, villag-
ers’ respond to the “carrot” of MPA configuration’s impact on dispersal (i.e. increased fish 
stocks in a particular site) and to the “stick” of the MPA’s potentially incomplete enforce-
ment (i.e. increased probability of being caught and losing their harvest), in addition to 
other characteristics of the setting. We find that the optimal MPA differs markedly across 
management goals and non-monotonically across budgets in ways that reflect the villagers’ 
spatially explicit response, in the form of a spatial Nash equilibrium, to the MPA at the 
long run steady state fish stock. Previous studies that consider enforcement costs and the 
response to incomplete enforcement in making MPA siting decisions either conduct that 
analysis with assumptions about constant fishing effort (Byers and Noonburg 2007) or in 
an implicitly spatial setting without modeling distance as a component of the fishers’ site 
choice (Yamazaki et al. 2014).
Furthermore, we show the potential shortcomings of establishing an MPA based on 
often-used goals that do not consider either the full livelihood of the villagers (i.e. fish-
ing income and non-fishing income) or the full marinescape (i.e. stock inside and outside 
the MPA). First, while the economics literature on marine protection typically considers 
only economic outcomes within fisheries (e.g. Smith and Wilen 2003), MPAs may shift 
labor out of fishing and into other sectors of the economy. By introducing onshore wage 
labor as an outside option, we can compare the standard goal of yield-maximization with a 
more holistic goal of maximizing income for the villagers (i.e. a better measure of welfare). 
By allowing for onshore wage labor and constraining the manager’s enforcement capac-
ity, our model highlights the distinction between yield- and income-maximization that is 
particularly salient in low- and middle-income countries where artisanal fishers frequently 
work multiple jobs and limited enforcement capacity cannot completely deter illegal har-
vest. Second, while ecological conservation goals typically focus on outcomes within the 
geographic footprint of the PA itself, incomplete enforcement can cause economic activ-
ity to spillover to nearby areas just outside the enforced zone (Robalino et al. 2017) and 
fish dispersal from sites of high relative fish density influence fishing site decisions such 
as “fishing the line” (Kellner et  al. 2007). If a naïve manager designs an MPA to maxi-
mize avoided stock loss only within the MPA itself, spillovers to adjacent fishing sites are 
likely to undermine its ecological impact across the full marinescape. By explicitly mod-
eling how both fish and people move across space, including across MPA borders, we com-
pare standard ecological MPA-focused goals with a broader objective to maximize avoided 
stock loss across the full marinescape.
Our results reveal qualitative and quantitative differences in optimal MPAs established 
to achieve different goals; show changes in MPA design across budget levels; elucidate 
relationships between enforcement levels and MPA outcomes; and inform a policy discus-
sion. Specifically, we make three main contributions. First, we extend the economic analy-
sis of MPAs by including multiple sites and spatially explicit modeling of villager labor 
and site decisions with heterogeneous distance costs and incomplete enforcement. Second, 
we extend the systematic conservation planning and reserve site selection literatures by 
including a model of fishers’ MPA response directly in the decision framework for select-
ing MPA sites. Third, by incorporating constrained enforcement budgets, our results speak 
to real-world challenges faced by PA managers. This article continues with the develop-
ment of a model that considers several manager goals. Section III presents the open access 
decisions of villagers in IIIA, the optimal MPAs from a manager who maximizes income 
and one who maximizes avoided stock loss across the marinescape in IIIB, and interprets 
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those results in IIIC. Section IV reports and interprets the MPA results of 3 “naïve” manag-
ers. Section V discusses the policy implications of the results and section VI concludes.
2  Model
2.1  Overview
We develop a spatial bio-economic model to study the MPA manager’s siting, sizing, 
and enforcement level decisions, given the presence of villagers who either fish or work 
onshore. First, we define our stylized marinescape spatial setting as an R × C matrix with a 
village located next to the first site (Fig. 1). The biological part of the model is a fish meta-
population structure with density dispersal. The economic part of the model includes two 
types of participants: N identical villagers and one manager. As the Stackelberg leader, the 
manager defines the MPA, comprised of no-take sites within the marinescape and the level 
of enforcement that maximizes the manager’s goal, considering both fish dynamics and 
the villagers’ equilibrium response. Each individual villager allocates labor across onshore 
wage labor and fishing labor to maximize their individual income. Each villager considers 
the other villagers’ choices, the location and level of enforcement within the MPA, distance 
costs, and fish stocks per site, which results in a spatial Nash equilibrium that constitutes 
the villagers’ best response to the Stackelberg leader’s MPA.
2.2  Fish Dynamics
In common with much of the marine economics literature, we define the biological and 
spatial setting as a fish metapopulation structure with adult fish density dispersal across the 
R × C marinescape. A fishing site, i , is one cell in that matrix, indexed from 1 to (R ⋅ C) . 
Cells—or fishing sites—in the first row, i ∈ {1,… ,C} , are closest to the shore (see Fig. 1). 
Fish net growth, harvest, and dispersal over time change the fish stock in each site:
where X
t
 is a (R ⋅ C) × 1 vector of fish stocks over fishing sites xi at time t , K is a (R ⋅ C) × 1 
vector of site carrying capacities, D is a (R ⋅ C) × (R ⋅ C) dispersal matrix, and Ht is a 
(R ⋅ C) × 1 vector of the sum of all individual fishers’ harvests from each site i at time t . 
The logistic function G(X
t
,K) = gX
t
(
1 −
Xt
K
)
 depicts natural population net growth at each 
specific site, with g indicating the intrinsic net growth rate. The dispersal matrix D opera-
tionalizes the density dependent dispersal process as a linear function of fish stocks of all 
sites with net dispersal to lower density neighbors that share a boundary through rook con-
tiguity (Sanchirico and Wilen 2001; Albers et al. 2015; see Appendix 1). Our results hold 
in the steady state stock of fish, X
SS
 , which occurs when X
t
= X
t+ퟏ.
2.3  Manager Decisions
Each manager selects sites to define an MPA that maximizes either an economic or an 
ecological goal. First, for the economic goal, we posit a manager who maximizes total 
income from fishing and non-fishing activities. This goal aligns with the objective func-
tion of a benevolent social planner and many lower income country managers (Carr et al. 
(1)Xt+ퟏ = Xt + G
(
X
t
,K
)
+ DX
t
−H
t
,
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2019; Madrigal-Ballestero et al. 2017). Consistent with the optimal enforcement literature, 
the income-maximizing manager accounts for both legal and illegal harvest (Stigler 1970; 
Milliman 1986).4 Second, for the ecological goal, we posit a manager who maximizes 
avoided aggregate fish stock losses (ASL) across the marinescape, recognizing the fun-
damental role that fish dispersal plays across the marinescape (Jentoft et al. 2011; Pressey 
and Bottrill 2009). This ASL-marinescape manager considers both the spatial leakage of 
fishing effort that generates stock losses in non-MPA sites and fish dispersal across MPA 
borders. In addition, this manager’s goal considers the additional benefits created by the 
MPA through the focus on “avoided stock loss” (Andam et al. 2008; Pfaff et al. 2014). The 
managers choose the size of the MPA (i.e. number of sites in the MPA) and the specific 
location of the MPA sites, creating an (R ⋅ C) × 1 element vector, S, where each element of 
the vector depicts whether that site is within the MPA:
The manager chooses one level of enforcement that is constant throughout the MPA at 
level 휙 ∈ [0, 1] , where 휙 = 1 denotes complete enforcement and implies a probability of 
being caught and punished of 1.5 Following the optimal enforcement literature, managers 
incur enforcement costs, 훽 , which here follow a linear and additive form with marginal cost 
c per unit 휙 per unit (Nostbakken 2008; Milliman 1986; Sutinen and Andersen 1985):
Each manager accounts for the villagers’ optimal responses to the MPA; thus, the man-
ager optimizes over the outcome of villagers’ Nash equilibrium location and labor choices 
in response to the MPA at the steady state for fish stocks.
The income-maximizing manager’s decision is:
The ASL-marinescape maximizing manager’s decision is:
si =
{
1 if site i is in the MPA
0 otherwise
.
훽 =
∑
i
si[c휙]
max
S,휙
∑
i
pHi(1 − 휙i) +
∑
n
w
(
lw,n
)훾
,
4 The optimal enforcement economics literature and practical input from managers state that managers 
focus on the full social value of harvested fish—including both legal and illegal harvest in their values—
although managers use a penalty of lost time and extraction when villagers are caught harvesting illegally 
(Stigler 1970; Milliman 1986).
5 We limit the manager to one level of enforcement throughout the MPA for computational and exposi-
tional ease. That constant level of enforcement reflects some settings that require all locations in a PA to 
be treated equally (e.g. Albers 2010). Related research with this model (Albers et al. 2015) and with terres-
trial models (Albers 2010; Albers and Robinson 2011, 2013) demonstrates that lower levels of enforcement 
probability are needed to deter illegal harvest in sites that are more distant, and Albers et al. (2019) defines 
optimal enforcement levels for each reserve in a terrestrial reserve network. Appendix D presents one case 
of enforcement distance costs that finds that reducing enforcement costs near the village leads to MPAs 
closer to the village and that these lower near-village costs enable managers to achieve their MPA goals 
at lower budgets. Albers et al. (2020) considers enforcement distance costs in a similar marinescape with 
1-site MPAs. In addition, based on fieldwork, the impact of distance costs on villager site choices appears 
large relative to the impact of distance costs on patrolling decisions, especially in the marine setting with 
guards in motorboats and artisanal fishers in dhows.
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where xi,OA depicts the open access equilibrium and steady state stock value in site i , p is 
the exogenous price of fish per unit harvest, lw,n is the villager n ’s allocation of onshore 
wage labor, w is the exogenous onshore wage, and 훾 ∈ (0, 1) creates diminishing returns to 
onshore labor (reflecting imperfect labor markets). Both managers make these maximiza-
tion decisions subject to fish dispersal (Eq. 1) and the best response of the villagers’ opti-
mization and Nash equilibrium, which determine H and X . To consider a lower income 
country setting, we evaluate the managers’ decisions subject to an enforcement budget con-
straint: B ≥ 훽.
To reflect common goals of the fishery economics literature, systematic conserva-
tion literature, conservation economics literature, and lower income country regional 
development and conservation managers, we also consider several “naïve” managers 
who do not consider the entire setting in their decisions. First, a naïve manager with an 
economic goal maximizes the yield or the fishery profits from the marinescape but dis-
regards the MPA’s impact on total income. Second, two other naïve managers with eco-
logical goals consider only the stock inside the MPA: An ASL-MPA manager considers 
only the avoided stock loss within the MPA rather than considering the marinescape, 
and an MPA-stock manager maximizes the fish stock within the MPA rather than con-
sidering the additional benefits created by the MPA.
The yield-maximizing manager’s decision is:
The ASL-MPA maximizing manager’s decision is:
The MPA-stock maximizing manager’s decision is:
max
S,휙
∑
i
[xi − xi,OA],
max
S,휙
∑
i
Hi(1 − 휙i)
max
S,휙
∑
i
si[xi − xi,OA]
Fig. 1  Spatial setting. The 
dashed lines represent the 
distance from the village to each 
fishing site and the wide arrows 
show the dispersal of the fish 
within the marinescape. The vec-
tor below the marinescape figure 
corresponds to the vectorization 
of the marinescape matrix
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We also consider two naïve managers—one based on the ASL-marinescape maximizer 
and one based on the income-maximizer—who make MPA decisions assuming either that 
their budget is large enough to induce complete deterrence or that their MPA automatically 
produces complete deterrence.
2.4  Villagers
We include one village with N identical villagers who have full information about the MPA 
and the resource setting. Each villager, n , seeks to maximize income by allocating labor 
across two activities: fishing and onshore wage labor. This labor allocation framework 
reflects the reality that many villagers allocate time across several activities, including 
between fishing and tourism-related activities (Muthiga 2009; Madrigal-Ballestero et  al. 
2017) and between fishing and subsistence agriculture (Rahman et al. 2012; Robinson et al. 
2014).6 To achieve his goal, each villager chooses either to not fish at all, or to fish in one 
site; and if the latter, how much time to fish, how much time to work onshore, and the fish-
ing site. Each villager recognizes that he has a fixed amount of labor time ( Ln ) to allocate 
to working onshore ( lw ), fishing in a given site ( lf ,i ), and traveling in his boat from the vil-
lage to the fishing site ( ld(i)):
Labor time in fishing represents the marginal cost of fishing and labor time for travel 
to a fishing site captures the fixed distance costs of fishing, both valued at the opportunity 
cost of time (i.e. the onshore wage). Fishing sites in our model differ due to two types of 
spatial heterogeneity, in contrast with the standard spatially homogeneous frameworks (e.g. 
Sanchirico and Wilen 2001). First, each fishing site is located at a different distance from 
the village, inducing heterogeneous travel costs ld(i) . Second, fish dispersal patterns are spa-
tially explicit, inducing heterogeneous returns to fishing across sites.
We assume a standard harvest function:
where an individual villager’s harvest in a given site i, hi,n, depends on the amount of labor 
time that villager allocates to fishing in the site ( lf ,i,n) as the marginal cost of fishing, the 
stock of fish in the site, ( xi ), and the catchability coefficient ( q ). The individual villager’s 
harvest does not directly depend on the number of other villagers in the site (i.e. no conges-
tion costs), but it indirectly depends on the other villagers’ harvest in the site through the 
steady state equilibrium stock effect, as in Eq. 1. The total harvest in a given site is the sum 
of all villagers’ harvests in the site i:
max
S,휙
∑
i
si[xi]
(2)Ln ≥ lw,n + lf ,i,n + ld(i),n.
(3)hi,n = lf ,i,nxiq,
(4)Hi =
∑
n
hi,n
6 Settings in which fishers have no alternative livelihood opportunities (e.g. Nayak 2017) correspond to a 
zero-wage scenario in this model.
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Dynamic stock effects occur through the impact of the total harvest on the state variable 
xi (an element of X in the equation of fish dynamics) in the steady state. Given this inter-
action of villagers’ decisions in determining the steady state, a steady state spatial Nash 
equilibrium defines the fishing locations and fishing labor for each villager, in which each 
villager has no incentive to move to another site nor to alter their optimally chosen labor 
allocation. In addition, to simplify the problem, we constrain each villager to fish in at 
most one site and assume that villagers know the resource stock sizes and distance costs in 
choosing that site.7
Finally, all n villagers share the same goal of maximizing their individual income:
with p , w , and 훾 as previously defined. Unlike other models with a fixed entry cost, by 
explicitly incorporating the onshore wage option in decisions, this model permits explo-
ration of villagers’ responses to MPAs including both changes at the intensive margin of 
fishing effort and the extensive margin (i.e. exit from fishing). The enforcement param-
eter 휙i enters each villager’s objective function to reflect the probability that the man-
ager detects and punishes illegal harvesting, which reduces a villager’s expected income 
from that location and labor choice. In keeping with the lower income country setting, the 
model posits that villagers lose their illegal harvest if caught, and incur time costs, but not 
an additional fine. The parameter 휙i is equal to 0 if the site i is not a protected area and 
equal to 휙 ∈ [0, 1] otherwise. 휙 = 1 implies that no illegal harvesting goes undetected; no-
enforcement, 휙 = 0 , implies that no illegal harvesting is detected; and intermediate levels 
of enforcement, 0 < 𝜙 < 1 , can deter some or all illegal harvesting depending on the fish-
ers’ alternatives.
2.5  Solution Method and Parameters
The model is not analytically tractable, and we solve it using numerical methods in MAT-
LAB for the specific spatial setting in Fig. 1 (see "Appendix 2" for details). We use a 2 × 3 
grid (i.e. 6 fishing sites) with one fish subpopulation located at the centroid of each cell of 
(5)maxi,lf ,i,lw
[
phi
(
1 − 휙i
)
+ w(lw)
훾
]
,
7 Most spatial fishery economics papers do not include a site or location decision for each fisher. Instead, 
most models allocate fishing effort across all sites to meet an economic condition such as rent dissipation in 
an open access setting (e.g. Sanchirico and Wilen 2001). Here, we include the site choice but are computa-
tionally constrained to consider only one site rather than exploring ‘sets of sites’ choices. Still, total fisher 
effort is being allocated across space in this framework, and in much the same way that effort is distributed 
in models that allocate effort across space to meet rent dissipation without considering decisions—includ-
ing a site decision—and without considering distance fixed costs and labor tradeoffs. Related models with 
extraction site choices demonstrate that extractors become one-site specializers in the presence of large 
enough distance costs; our constraint of a one site choice corresponds to a setting with significant distance 
costs (Sterner et al. 2018). Other related research explores multiple extraction sites (Albers et al. 2019). In 
addition, models that allocate the effort to meet the rent dissipation condition approach tacitly assume that 
effort responds to known stock sizes without fixed distance costs. We explore the microeconomic foun-
dations of villager decisions, including an explicit fishing site choice, based on full information, which is 
called for in Sanchirico and Wilen (2001). Furthermore, in practice, villagers report having experience that 
generates local knowledge of approximate relative and actual stock sizes. Still, as per a reviewer’s comment, 
the assumption of full information about stock sizes based on experience and a steady state outcome does 
not fit a setting in which fishers perform costly stock assessments or costly search for high density fish sites.
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the grid.8 Sites in column 2 disperse with 3 neighbors through rook dispersal, while sites 
in columns 1 and 3 disperse with only 2 neighbors, creating heterogeneity in dispersal. A 
single village comprised of 12 villagers located at the top of the leftmost column, near-
est to the first site, provides an asymmetric benchmark marinescape with six biologically 
identical fish sites (i.e. each site’s carrying capacity and intrinsic growth are identical) that 
differ only in their distance from the village.9 The villagers’ travel time is simply the Carte-
sian distance from the village to the centroid of the fishing site (parameters in Table 1). The 
solution is the spatial Nash equilibrium of the N identical villagers’ best response to the 
MPA setting, including each villagers’ fishing site choice and optimal labor allocation deci-
sions at the long-run biological (i.e. fish stock) steady-state. We parameterize the model to 
achieve an open access baseline setting with rents dissipated in each fishing site to reflect 
an overfished pre-policy setting. In our parameterization, adding a marginal unit of labor 
per villager or adding more villagers leads to no change in fishing labor or location deci-
sions because rents are dissipated above covering fixed distance costs to each site. Addi-
tional labor, or villagers, is optimally allocated to onshore wage work because no fishing 
rents exist in the marinescape that cover distance costs.10 
3  Results and Interpretation
Section A presents the open-access results of fisher decisions that generate the baseline, 
no-MPA setting. Section B presents the optimal MPAs of the income-maximizing and 
ASL-maximizing managers across budgets. Section C discusses each of the manager con-
trol variables for their impact on villager decisions and develops intuition and general 
statements about optimal MPA design.
8 Representing fishing sites as centroids of grid cells is identical to representing a set of fish “patches” as 
circles in space with the distances between all patches explicitly defined. We chose the centroid and grid 
marinescape representation because this style makes figures easier to read and provides well defined spatial 
relationships between fishing sites and between fishing sites and the village.
9 We chose 12 villagers (or groups of villagers) to have enough actors to see a range of patterns of villager 
distribution across the marinescape, including an even distribution of 2 villagers per site. We parameter-
ized the model to ensure that additional villagers would not enter fishing and to ensure rent dissipation after 
covering fixed distance costs. We consider the impact of smaller numbers of villagers (allowing for the 
possibility of no rent dissipation) in Albers et al. (2015). We chose this 2 × 3 marinescape and village loca-
tion because it is the minimum sized marinescape to be able to explore both heterogenous distance costs 
and MPA configuration’s impact on fish dispersal. A marinescape width of 3 permits sites with no fishing 
at a distance without an MPA and fishing in those sites with an MPA in the column at moderate distance. 
A marinescape depth of 2 permits different configurations of the same sized MPA to impact dispersal dif-
ferently. We locate the village at one edge of the marinescape to capture heterogeneity of distance costs; 
placing the village in the center necessitates a marinescape of width 5 to capture the relevant relationships 
between distance, site choices, and MPA configurations. In addition, a central village leads to mirror image 
identical outcomes and multiple mirror equilibria without adding insight. We explore a center village loca-
tion in Albers et al. (2015) and a two-village setting in Capitán et al. (2020). Albers et al. (2020) also con-
siders different settings for dispersal across open marinescape borders.
10 The results below that demonstrate an increase in yield (identical to fishery profits) and income after 
defining MPAs is further evidence that the open access baseline case reflects an overfished marinescape as 
the starting point for MPA policy.
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3.1  Open‑Access (Baseline)
To determine the impact of an MPA policy, we use the model of open access equilibrium 
to define a baseline, working from the opposite starting point of, but in similar fashion to, 
the empirical park effectiveness analyses’ use of a von Thunen model to predict patterns of 
resource extraction without a PA. Villagers’ equilibrium labor allocation and fishing site 
decisions depend directly on the onshore wage, distance costs (opportunity cost of time), 
time spent fishing, and the fishing site choice.11 Returns from fishing reflect total fishing 
effort at a site and net fish stock following dispersal. In the open-access equilibrium, for 
our specific calibration, all villagers choose to fish, and fishing occurs in 5 of the 6 sites. 
Villagers’ labor allocations differ (Fig. 2a); more villagers fish in sites close to the village 
than far from the village due to distance costs (Fig. 2b). Site 1, closest to the village, hosts 
the highest number of villagers and total fishing labor (Fig. 2b), which drives down fish 
stock there (Fig. 2c). The stock levels in each site are the elements of the vector of open 
access baseline stocks, X
OA
.
The open access baseline reflects both distance costs and dispersal. Distance costs alone 
keep villagers from the most distant site (site 6) despite high equilibrium fish stocks there 
(Fig.  2c), just as distance protects the interior of forests surrounded by encroaching or 
extracting villagers (Albers 2010; Robinson et al. 2011). Distance acts as a fixed cost to 
entry in a particular site, implicitly valued at the wage rate, and reduce the labor time avail-
able for wage work and fishing. Therefore, in a labor-constrained setting, sites with high 
marginal fishing values can remain unfished. The many villagers who fish in site 1 each 
face low travel costs but also low steady state stocks, and allocate the least time to fishing 
of all villagers (Fig. 2a). Heterogeneity in dispersal results in sites in column two (sites 2 
and 5) supporting more fishing than sites in column three (sites 3 and 6), and only slightly 
less than sites in column one (sites 1 and 4).12 The baseline parameterization and pattern 
of fishing effort reflects observations in Costa Rica, where villagers who fish agglomerate 
near shore and fish less per person than the smaller number of villagers located at more 
distant sites (Madrigal-Ballestero et al. 2017).
11 Reflecting stakeholder interviews in Costa Rica and Tanzania, distance costs enter villager decisions as 
the opportunity cost of time. Analysis of this framework with wage equal to zero, or no alternative to fish-
ing labor, implies that all villagers put all of their time into fishing and make location choices of fishing 
sites based on maximizing their yield because yield is equivalent to income maximization without an out-
side option for labor time. Because distance costs are based on time and valued at the on-shore wage, the 
zero wage scenario also limits the spatial aspects of the decisions to addressing the labor time constraint—
lower amount of time available for fishing in more distant sites—relative to the returns based on dispersal 
and the number of other fishers in each site.
12 In comparison to the current parameters, homogeneous distance costs lead to a smoother distribution 
of fishing effort across space, but, showing the impact of dispersal, more fishers locate in column two than 
the edge columns in this setting (Appendix  3). Similarly, the no dispersal case also leads to a smoother 
distribution of fishing effort across space than the current case with dispersal, but the impact of distance 
costs encourages more fishers near the village (Appendix 3). High wages induce villagers to allocate more 
time to wage work and less time to fishing. On aggregate, wage levels correlate negatively with fishing 
labor, harvests, and fish stocks while correlating positively with wage labor and total income (Albers et al. 
2015). Heterogenous but low (high) distance costs lead to villagers choosing higher (lower) levels of fishing 
effort overall due to lower (higher) costs and to more (fewer) villagers choosing to fish in more distant sites 
because labor time constraints is less (more) binding (Albers et al. 2015).
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3.2  Optimal MPA Location, Size, and Enforcement Level
The optimal MPAs—set of sites and enforcement level—of the income-maximizing man-
ager and the ASL-marinescape manager differ from each other, and across budgets, in size 
(number of MPA sites), configuration (specific set of sites), and enforcement levels ( 휙 ) 
(Fig.  3).13 With no budget constraint, the ASL-maximizing manager includes the entire 
marinescape in the MPA, deterring all fishing. Avoided stock losses in the marinescape rise 
monotonically as the enforcement budget is parametrically increased from zero until com-
plete deterrence occurs at 휙 = 0.584 (Fig. 3, last column), at which point all villagers have 
exited fishing. In contrast, the unconstrained income-maximizing manager places the MPA 
in the 2 most fished pre-MPA sites and includes a third MPA site (site 5), but chooses not 
to fully enforce the MPA. For our specific calibration, 2 villagers are induced to exit fish-
ing, which reduces the over-extraction pressure in non-MPA and MPA sites and improves 
aggregate income (first and last column, Fig. 4b), yet does not completely deter extraction 
in the MPA (Fig. 3). The income-maximizing MPA creates avoided stock loss within the 
MPA that is partially offset by increased stock loss in two non-MPA sites, including the 
most distant site (6), in which no fishing occurs without the MPA (Fig. 4c).
In many settings, particularly in lower-income countries, budget constraints limit the 
level of enforcement that a manager can exert within an MPA. For both manager types, 
as we parametrically increase the enforcement budget from zero, the budget-constrained-
optimal MPA changes until the budget permits the optimal amount of enforcement for 
the optimal MPA size and siting (Figs. 3, 5 and 6). The ASL-maximizing manager typi-
cally selects larger MPAs and enforces at higher levels than income-maximizing managers 
(Fig. 3, 5 and 6). At most budget levels, villagers respond to the ASL-maximizer’s MPAs 
Table 1  Parameter values Description Parameter Value
No. of columns (moving along the coast) – 3
No. of rows (moving out to sea) – 2
Width of each column – 4
Width of each row – 3.5
Position of village by column – 1
Number of villagers  N 12
Intrinsic growth rate  g 0.4
Dispersal coefficient (from Smith et al. 2009)  m 0.4
Price of fish  p 1
Wage rate for non-fishing labor  w 1.25
Wage parameter (opportunity cost of time)  훾 0.6
Total time available per person  L 24
Catchability coefficient  qi,∀ i 0.007
Carrying capacity for each site  ki,∀ i 100
Cost of 휙
i
= 1 for one site  c 30
13 Each manager perfectly anticipates how the villagers’ best response to the MPA they create as a Stack-
elberg leader leads to post-MPA outcomes in the biological steady state and Nash equilibrium of villagers’ 
decisions.
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by exiting fishing, concentrating fishing effort in some sites that receive dispersal, and 
avoiding fishing in some MPA sites (Fig. 7). In contrast, the income-maximizing manager 
typically locates their MPAs close to the village where the MPA restrictions solve some of 
the open-access over-extraction problem that arises from low distance costs in near-village 
sites. Villagers respond to the MPA by exiting fishing and distributing remaining fishing 
across the marinescape.
3.3  MPA Instruments to Determine Villager Responses
The specific choices of location/configuration, size, and enforcement of an MPA—the 
MPA manager’s control variables in the model and policy instruments in practice—deter-
mine the reaction of villagers to the MPA, which determines the MPA’s ecological and 
economic outcomes. Considering how each instrument influences villager responses, and 
how the instruments interact in that influence, informs general rules for MPA design across 
settings.
3.3.1  Configuration of the MPA
The configuration of MPA sites enters villagers’ decisions through the impact of distance 
costs on fishing site choice and through how dispersal affects returns to fishing in non-
MPA sites. With low enforcement budgets, an income maximizing manager relies on MPA 
configuration to create dispersal patterns that provide incentives—a carrot—for villagers 
to choose particular sites for fishing. For example, for our specific calibration, at a low 
budget, the income-maximizer includes site 5 in the MPA, which creates enough dispersal 
to sites 2, 4, and 6 to encourage villagers to spread out across sites 1 and 2 near the village 
and sites 4 and 6 (Figs. 3 and 4). The ASL-marinescape manager’s particular configura-
tion of MPA sites varies considerably as budget increases (Fig. 5). At high budgets, for our 
specific calibration, this manager’s configuration creates deterrence in sites that increase 
dispersal to the near-village site (site 1), which results in both high levels of fishing and 
negative avoided stock loss in that site (Figs. 3, 5 and 7).
3.3.2  Enforcement Level
Enforcement reduces expected fishing returns in a protected site, which enters villag-
ers’ decisions as a disincentive—a stick—to fishing and fishing effort in particular sites 
and to fishing effort. For our specific calibration, the ASL-maximizing manager is able 
to deter all fishing in the marinescape with 휙 ≤ 0.6 (Fig. 3); perfect detection, 휙 = 1 , is 
not necessary to deter all fishing. However, the minimum level of enforcement that pro-
duces complete deterrence does require relatively large budgets (Fig. 3). In contrast, the 
Fig. 2  Open access. a Depicts the labor allocation per villager in each site. For example, each villager who 
fishes in site 1 spends about 11 h fishing (white), about 1 h traveling to the fishing site (light gray), and the 
remaining 12 h working onshore (black). This graph does not fully reflect the spatial configuration of the 
setting demonstrated in Fig. 1 because it uses the vectorized matrix of sites travel time increases the farther 
from the village to the fishing site, and it increases monotonically in the first row of the matrix (sites 1, 2, 
and 3). However, site 4 (row 2, column 1) is closer to the village than site 3 (row 1, column 3), and has a 
shorter travel time. In sites with no bar indicated in the figure, such as site 6, no one fishes. b Total fish-
ing labor across all villagers per site and the number of villagers in each site (numbers over bars). Panel C 
shows the fish stock in each site
▸
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income-maximizing manager achieves their optimal MPA management at relatively low 
enforcement and budget levels because this manager does not deter all fishing and instead 
deters enough fishing effort to reduce over-extraction from open access by inducing exit 
and limiting extraction in near-village sites (Fig. 3). While the income-maximizing man-
ager finds an internal optimum enforcement level that does not deter all fishing in their 
MPAs, the ASL-maximizing manager spends their entire enforcement budget until achiev-
ing complete deterrence.
3.3.3  MPA Size
With enforcement budgets spread across the MPA, decisions reflect trade-offs between 
size and enforcement levels when budget constraints bind. For the income maximizing 
manager, in general, MPA size increases with the budget until the budget-unconstrained 
optimal size is reached (Fig. 3). For the ASL-marinescape maximizing manager, however, 
increases in the budget lead unambiguously to increases in avoided stock loss, but the opti-
mal size of the MPA varies non-monotonically with budget because of tradeoffs between 
the size of the MPA and the level of enforcement possible across the MPA (Figs. 3, 5 and 
7). A budget increase can decrease the optimal MPA size when the extra budget permits 
increased enforcement across a smaller MPA, resulting in increased ASL.
3.3.4  Combining Control Variable Choices
Budget-constrained managers face interactions and trade-offs among their choice vari-
ables. The choice of enforcement level interacts with the choice of MPA size and location 
Fig. 3  Optimal MPA for each goal. The first column depicts the open access distribution of villagers. The 
number of villagers in each site is identified in the marinescape figure, and the number of villagers who 
choose not to fish is indicated by that number in the village location on the marinescape. The highlighted 
sites are the optimal MPA sites for each row’s manager. This figure’s last column contains the uncon-
strained budget scenarios discussed in Sect. 3.1
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Fig. 4  Optimal MPA to maximize income. Each column represents a different budget level from 0 (i.e. open 
access) to unlimited. a Labor allocation per villager; the white bars represent time spent fishing, the gray 
bars represent time traveling, and the black bars represent time spent working on shore. b Total fishing 
labor per site and the number of villagers in each site. c The fish stock. In b, c, black bars represent sites 
within the MPA
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Fig. 5  Changes in size and con-
figuration when maximizing ASL 
Marinescape with different budg-
ets. The gray sites are the optimal 
MPA sites for each budget level 
and the MPA size is the number 
of sites included in the MPA. 
Although the optimal enforce-
ment level increases between 
budget levels reported here, this 
figure contains every MPA size 
and configuration, which vary 
discretely as budget increases
Budget Outcome Enforcement Size Configuration
0 21.74 0.44 0.34
1 33.25 0.03 1
3 37.52 0.05 2
6 46.47 0.1 2
7 47.49 0.11 2
9 47.5 0.1 3
10 52.67 0.08 4
11 56.58 0.09 4
12 58.36 0.13 3
13 65.49 0.09 5
14 69.05 0.22 2
17 71.48 0.14 4
22 79.69 0.18 4
23 81.35 0.19 4
24 83.38 0.27 3
26 87.52 0.22 4
27 90.01 0.15 6
29 95.15 0.24 4
31 96.21 0.21 5
32 104.47 0.21 5
37 108.73 0.31 4
47 135.98 0.31 5
48 138.78 0.4 4
60 164.37 0.5 4
76 194.65 0.42 6
52 147.47 0.35 5
55 152.52 0.46 4
58 162.09 0.32 6
Optimal Siting, Sizing, and Enforcement of Marine Protected…
1 3
because the enforcement budget is spread evenly across the whole MPA; because more 
distant sites require lower levels of enforcement to deter fishing (Albers 2010; Robinson 
et al. 2010; Albers et al. 2015); and because can enforcement result in “policy-induced” 
fish sources for dispersal to other sites that villagers have a positive incentive to choose.
3.3.5  General Rules for MPA Siting
Although the details of our optimal MPA results are specific to one calibration, examining 
the open access villager response to other settings of distance costs and wages, in combi-
nation with how MPAs alter villagers’ decisions, reveals general rules for MPA siting in 
other settings.14 The central idea of this paper is that managers make effective policy when 
they incorporate the expected response of resource users—site, effort, and exit decisions—
in the MPA policy design, which implies that managers can design and enforce MPAs to 
induce changes in villager decisions. First, if distance costs are either small or homogene-
ous, managers cannot take advantage of distance-enforcement trade-offs. Instead, the opti-
mal MPA configuration alters villagers’ site decisions only through the impact of MPAs 
on dispersal (Appendix 3). Second, settings with a high onshore wage induce villagers to 
allocate relatively less labor to fishing due to marginal returns tradeoffs and to choose low-
distance cost fishing sites due to the high opportunity cost of time (Albers et  al. 2015). 
Similarly, settings with high distance costs also induce low fishing labor allocations and 
near-village fishing site choices (Albers et al. 2015).
Based on these observations, a general rule for real world managers with an income-
maximization goal is to locate moderate-sized MPAs in sites where enforcement leads to 
enough exit and reduction in fishing effort to solve the open access over-extraction prob-
lem—using some “stick” of enforcement and some “carrot” of directing dispersal. In con-
trast, a general rule for real world managers with an ASL-maximizing goal is to use their 
limited budgets to locate and size MPAs that create effective no-take sites that direct fish 
dispersal to sites close to the village where fishing effort is higher. ASL-managers with 
higher budgets can induce exit from fishing—primarily relying on the “stick” of enforce-
ment to deter fishing and using the “carrot” of directing dispersal to sites of high fishing. In 
Fig. 6  Changes in size and configuration when maximizing income with different budgets. The gray sites 
are the optimal MPA sites for each budget level and the MPA size is the number of sites included in the 
MPA. Although the optimal enforcement level increases between budget levels reported here, this figure 
contains every MPA size and configuration, which vary discretely as budget increases
14 We explore the sensitivity of one-site optimal MPAs to various parameter values (number of villagers, 
carrying capacity heterogeneity, wage, dispersal, open/closed borders, distance costs, and enforcement 
costs) in Albers et al. (2020).
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Fig. 7  Optimal MPA to maximize avoided fish stock in the marinescape. Each column represents a different 
budget level from 0 (i.e. open access) to unlimited. a Labor allocation per villager; the white bars represent 
time spent fishing, the gray bars represent time traveling, and the black bars represent time spent working 
on shore. b Total fishing labor per site and the number of villagers in each site. c The fish stock. In b, c, 
black bars represent sites within the MPA
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high wage or high distance cost settings, optimal MPA locations move closer to the village 
and require lower levels of enforcement due to the lower level of over-extraction generated 
by either the high wage or the high distance costs pulling villagers out of fishing overall 
and discouraging distant site fishing (Albers et al. 2015).
4  Results and Analysis of Naïve Manager Decisions
In our model, managers’ constrained-optimal MPA choices are made considering the 
impact on villagers’ livelihood or the full marinescape; and fully accounting for the 
response of all villagers to an MPA and its enforcement level. For livelihood considera-
tions, our managers focus on total labor income rather than only that generated by fishing. 
Villagers, in turn, respond to the actual enforcement level in MPAs when making fishing 
effort and site decisions. However, many MPA economic models and practical siting deci-
sions ignore one or more these aspects. This section explores how such “naïve” assump-
tions impact MPA design and outcomes.
4.1  Yield‑Maximizing and Fishery Profit‑Maximizing MPA Decisions
Much of the fishery policy and fishery economics literature focuses on how policies such 
as MPAs improve yield (harvest) and fishery profits.15 We posit a “naïve” yield-maximiz-
ing manager and compare their optimal MPA choice with a manager who optimizes over 
the MPA’s full impact on economic development, as measured by total income rather than 
fishing income alone. First, in the absence of an onshore wage option, income is isomor-
phic with yield, and the two manager types choose identical MPAs. Second, across a range 
of enforcement budgets and on-shore wage options, the income-maximizing manager’s 
optimal choice of MPA differs from the yield-maximizing manager’s in size, configuration/
location, and enforcement level. For our specific calibration, the income-maximizer’s MPA 
contains 3 sites, whereas the budget-unconstrained optimal MPA for the yield maximizer 
contains two near-village sites and uses a lower level of enforcement (Figs. 3 and 14 in the 
Appendix). The income-maximizers’ strategy induces exit, whereas the yield-maximizing 
manager’s MPA induces villagers to choose fishing sites that reduce the stock effect of 
over-extraction in particular sites and creates patterns of effort that generate, or take advan-
tage of, dispersal. These differences in MPA strategies imply that analysts who focus only 
on fishery yield and profits miss opportunities to use MPAs to improve regional incomes. 
In addition, yield analyses cannot address policies that pair MPAs with income-generating 
projects that can reduce pressure on fishery resources by inducing villagers to replace fish-
ing effort with new on-shore income-generating activities.
4.2  MPA‑Focused Decisions
Many conservation goals rely on metrics such as the size of the PA rather than metrics that 
convey the additional conservation benefits created by PA. For example, the Convention on 
Biodiversity identifies percentages of land and marinescapes to be in PAs. Similarly, PA 
15 Here, maximizing total yield is identical to maximizing fishery profits because prices are fixed and har-
vest costs are in terms of labor time.
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managers’ face mandates to focus on the management and conservation of their particular 
PA rather than considering the PA’s contribution to conservation at the system or landscape 
level. Here, we explore how the choices of two MPA-focused naïve managers differ from a 
marinescape perspective.
4.2.1  Maximizing Avoided Stock Loss in MPAs
Although policy and economics literatures describe the leakage of extraction activities, and 
spatial spillovers of ecosystem services, from protected areas into other areas, many PA 
siting decisions and park effectiveness evaluations do not consider these landscape effects 
(Delacote and Angelsen 2015; Robinson et al. 2013). Here, a manager who focuses only 
on the avoided stock loss in the MPA and is “naïve to the marinescape”, the ASL-MPA 
manager, places the entire marinescape within the MPA at an unconstrained budget level 
(Figs. 3 and 16 in the Appendix), exactly as does the ASL-marinescape manager. At lower 
budgets that reflect low and middle income settings, managers face a tradeoff between the 
MPA size and the level of enforcement achievable at each budget and consequently choose 
smaller MPAs to ensure that the probability of being caught is sufficient to reduce extrac-
tion within the MPA. The “naïve” ASL-MPA manager typically chooses an MPA that is 
larger, where the probability of a fisher being caught is smaller, and with a different con-
figuration, than the ASL-marinescape choice of MPA (Figs. 5 and 17 in the Appendix). 
The ASL-MPA manager’s MPAs include sites with complete deterrence, often including 
the most village-distant sites (3 and 6) that are easiest to protect due to distance; but also 
include near-village site 1 when the probability of being caught encourages villagers to 
exit. In settings where sites both in and outside of the MPA contribute ecological benefits, 
these differences imply inefficiencies associated with designing MPAs without considering 
marinescape-wide impact.
4.2.2  Maximizing MPA Stock
Some frameworks for selecting MPA sites focus on conserving the highest possible stocks 
within the MPA rather than using MPAs to produce the highest avoided stock losses within 
the MPA or across the marinescape; the emphasis is on stock levels rather than on the addi-
tionality of the policy.16 We define the MPA-stock maximizing manager’s optimal MPA 
across budgets (Appendix 4 and Appendix Figs.  18 and 19). The MPA-stock maximiz-
ing manager’s MPA creates 18, 34, 57, and 78 percent of the avoided stock loss generated 
by the ASL-MPA maximizing manager at budgets 5, 15, 25, and 35, respectively. These 
results demonstrate that ecological triage methods of establishing MPAs, such as basing 
MPA locations on the level of a metric as opposed to basing MPA decisions on the addi-
tional conservation created by the MPA, lead to less conservation than can be achieved at 
each budget.
16 We focus on the within-MPA stock versus ASL cases because maximizing stock over the marinescape is 
identical to maximizing avoided stock loss at the marinescape level.
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4.3  Assuming Full Enforcement
MPA managers in lower-income countries must often choose the location and size of an 
MPA while considering limited enforcement budgets that are insufficient to prevent all 
fishing within the MPA. Yet economic models, implementation software, and managers 
often tacitly assume that enforcement is costless or leads to perfect compliance (Albers 
et al. 2016; Watts et al. 2009). We define a naïve ASL-marinescape and a naïve income-
maximizing manager who assume that any MPA completely deters harvest or that their 
budget is large enough to generate the desired level of deterrence. For each of their opti-
mal MPAs, we calculate the level of enforcement possible for that MPA per budget and 
determine the villager response to the MPA at that level of enforcement rather than at the 
assumed complete deterrence. We compare these budget constrained outcomes from the 
complete-deterrence MPA to the outcomes from the optimal MPAs across budgets.
The enforcement-naïve ASL-maximizing manager chooses an MPA covering the entire 
marinescape, and assumes all villagers will become wage-specializers (Appendix 7). Yet 
with low enforcement budgets spread over the large MPA, the MPA creates little actual 
deterrence, and this strategy has minimal impact on villager’s decisions with only mar-
ginal decreases in fishing effort (Appendix 7). As compared to the ASL-maximizing man-
ager who concentrates the limited budget for enforcement in a smaller number of sites, 
the enforcement-naïve ASL-maximizing manager’s MPA with budget-constrained enforce-
ment generates 30 percent of the avoided stock losses at a budget of 5, and 83 percent at a 
budget of 25 (Appendix Figs. 20 and 21).
The enforcement-naïve income-maximizer does not aim to deter all fishing, yet, at low 
budgets, they incorrectly assume their budget is large enough to create their desired level 
of deterrence. In this case, their “naïve” choice of MPA is larger and has less enforce-
ment at low budgets than the income-maximizer MPA (Appendix 7). In contrast, if the 
enforcement-naïve income-maximizer assumes that any MPA generates complete deter-
rence, our baseline income-maximizing manager remains in open-access rather than use 
MPAs that over-deter villagers from fishing, which reduces income. This type of naivete 
loses the gains possible from using incompletely enforced MPAs, as in the optimal income-
maximizing MPAs.
5  Discussion and Policy Implications
5.1  Management Goals
MPAs are recognized as an important tool for fishery management by both resource 
economists and fishery practitioners (Carr et  al. 2019; Rassweiler et  al. 2012; Castilla 
2010). Other conservation and regional development organizations view MPAs as tools 
for broader development or conservation goals (Jentoft et  al. 2011; Geange et  al. 2017). 
More generally, MPAs are viewed as mechanisms to provide both marine conservation val-
ues and fishery incomes (Jentoft et al. 2011; Smith and Wilen 2003; Gaylord et al. 2005; 
Gaines et al. 2010). Here, we find considerable differences across all budget levels in the 
optimal MPAs designed for economic goals and for ecological goals. Economic goals that 
appear similar—maximizing yield and maximizing income—lead to different optimal 
MPA sites and enforcement levels across many budget levels, which serves as a caution to 
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economists and managers about inappropriate interpretations of MPA frameworks based 
on yield profits alone. Because many villagers’ income derives from labor allocation deci-
sions between fishing and onshore wage activities, and because reaching more distant fish-
ing sites requires labor that could otherwise be spent on income-generating activities, a 
focus on yield in MPA siting and analysis fails to fully characterize the impact of MPAs on 
villagers’ total income. Similarly, two ecological goals—avoided stock loss at the marines-
cape level and at the MPA level—are achieved with different MPA sites and enforcement 
levels until the budget is sufficient for the entire marinescape to be fully protected from 
fishing. Because ecological benefits derive from the whole marinescape, including leakage 
of fishing and spillovers of fish across MPA borders, a focus on in-MPA metrics fails to 
capture benefits both lost and created outside of the MPA. The differences in constrained 
and unconstrained MPAs across budgets and managers demonstrate that efficient MPA site 
selection and management requires careful consideration of the appropriate goal of creat-
ing MPAs and of the relevant budget level.
5.1.1  Policy Effectiveness
Economists may evaluate policy based on its effectiveness at creating positive net change 
or preventing negative outcomes. Conservation policy may follow a triage approach, such 
as focusing limited budgets on conserving high-stock areas. Although the bulk of our anal-
ysis considers avoided fish stock losses, we also show that managers who seek to maxi-
mize the stock within the MPA—rather than the avoided stock loss—employ marinescape-
wide MPAs that, with low budgets, produce limited additional benefits because they fail to 
change villager behavior. These results demonstrate the missed conservation opportunities 
that derive from decisions based on total stock size within MPAs rather than on the conser-
vation additionality created by the MPA.
5.2  Incomplete Enforcement
In the systematic conservation planning and PA economics literatures, protected area siting 
decisions rarely consider the impact of incomplete enforcement on extractor decisions and 
instead assume costless and complete enforcement (Ando et al. 1998; Sanchirico and Wilen 
2001). In practice, no protected area siting software, such as Marxan, contains enforce-
ment costs with a reaction of villagers (fishers or terrestrial extractors) to that enforce-
ment within the site or sizing decision (Watts et  al. 2009; Arafeh-Dalmau et  al. 2017). 
Although the practical implementation of MPAs addresses villagers’ needs, including the 
use of benefits-sharing or community management and sometimes re-design of MPAs 
based on villagers’ concerns, such programs typically occur after the selection of the MPA 
sites. Similarly, the economic literature on terrestrial park effectiveness largely ignores the 
impact of enforcement spending on that effectiveness. Although transponder signals pre-
sent a low-cost enforcement mechanism, incomplete enforcement occurs in both low- and 
high-income country MPAs. Given the “paper park” phenomenon and suggestions from 
MPA managers that enforcement budgets are lower than needed to induce full compliance, 
our results demonstrate that ignoring enforcement costs and villager reactions to incom-
plete enforcement limits the conservation gains possible from MPAs. Economic efficiency 
requires decisions based on the reality of costly and incomplete enforcement—whether due 
to budget constraints or optimal marginal tradeoffs.
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5.3  Broader Policy Implications
The results here inform discussion about the implementation of MPAs that are not no-take 
reserves; marinescape versus MPA perspectives; and other settings.
5.3.1  Beyond No‑Take Zones: IUCN Classifications
Limited enforcement budgets in lower-income country no-take PAs lead to illegal harvest, 
or poaching, within PAs. Our analysis identifies situations in which the yield or income 
maximizing manager chooses not to use the full enforcement budget but rather chooses 
to allow some illegal harvest. This situation arises when a no-take mandate contradicts a 
manager’s preference to maximize yields or income across a marine or landscape. To avoid 
costly conflict between PA guards and villagers, but still achieve their objectives, man-
agers in lower-income country settings might choose less restrictive IUCN classifications 
of their MPA rather than implementing incompletely enforced no-take reserves (Robinson 
et  al. 2010, 2013; Ferraro and Hanauer 2011). For example, some of Tanzania’s MPAs 
permit villagers to harvest within MPAs, with managers enforcing gear restrictions or com-
munity access restrictions instead of a complete ban on fishing. Similarly, in one of Tan-
zania’s IUCN category II PAs, the management committee permitted limited harvesting 
inside the perimeter of the reserve to reduce overall ecological damage and conflict result-
ing from imperfect efforts to fully enforce the no-take mandate (Robinson et al. 2011). In 
addition, some empirical terrestrial research suggests that extraction-permitting PAs can 
avoid more deforestation than more restrictive PAs (Pfaff et al. 2014; Ferraro et al. 2013). 
Some PAs have managed to stop land-use change and degradation in cases where PAs use 
co-management and allow multiple uses (Nelson and Chomitz 2011; Herrera et al. 2019; 
UNEP-WCMC 2016; Robinson et al. 2008). Our framework of PA choices as a function of 
villagers’ responses could be the basis for future research of access restrictions or IUCN 
classification—beyond no-take reserves—as a choice variable to achieve both ecological 
and economic goals and for analyzing co-managed MPAs instead of enforced MPAs (Rob-
inson et al. 2008).
5.3.2  MPA‑ Versus Marinescape‑Focused Resource Conservation
Our analysis demonstrates clear inefficiencies at the level of the marinescape when the 
MPA manager does not account for the impact of leakage of fishing effort, or the impact 
of dispersal of fish, to non-MPA sites. Although inefficient, many organizations and 
managers base their assessment of success on in-MPA status and economists evaluating 
park effectiveness often consider the avoided losses within the park rather than across a 
landscape. In contrast, in other settings, such as establishing REDD forests, landscape 
perspectives and the role of leakage are central to the discussion, albeit often without 
a model of how resource extractors respond to a policy to create leakage. In our open 
access with distance costs setting, fishers’ effort can only “leak” to sites to which the 
MPA generates enough dispersal to support additional effort above the starting point 
equilibrium effort levels (as in Sanchirico and Wilen 2001). Organizations seeking effi-
cient production of avoided stock losses across the marinescape must charge the MPA 
implementation team with that marinescape goal rather than assume that a high in-MPA 
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effectiveness at avoiding stock losses correlates well with avoided stock losses at the 
marinescape level. To make such marinescape decisions, however, managers must pre-
dict the pattern of extraction that results from villagers’ response to the MPA in their 
MPA design decisions, as is done here.
5.3.3  Across Settings
This research focuses on settings in which resource extractors make labor allocation 
decisions across income-generating activities facing time constraints and distance costs; 
and on costly enforcement settings. To apply this model and results to other settings, 
parameters can be changed and budget constraints removed. For example, settings in 
which fishers only fish can be considered by setting wage to zero (as in Albers et  al. 
2015, 2020). Similarly, settings in which distance costs do not dominate fisher site 
choices can be considered by setting distance costs to zero (as in Albers et  al. 2015, 
2020). Although enforcement budget constraints appear particularly binding in many 
lower income settings, the sheer size of PAs and diversity of illegal activities in high-
income country settings pose challenges to enforcement of MPA restrictions. For exam-
ple, illegal fishing in MPAs can be difficult and costly to identify if fishers employ 
avoidance activities such as turning off transponders. Our framework focuses on using 
MPAs to alter fishing activities, which can generalize to considering MPAs as part of 
conservation policies to achieve ecological goals beyond the fish stocks considered here, 
such as removing long-line fishing from turtle or whale migration paths (Capitán et al. 
2020; Hayes et al. 2018). Given the emphasis on fisher decisions, however, this frame-
work does not generalize well to settings in which non-fishing activities generate threats 
to MPA goals, such as tourists harassing protected marine animals (NOAA 2020).
5.4  Relationship to Research and Policy Literatures
5.4.1  Ongoing and Future Research
This framework forms a foundation to explore other aspects of MPA siting and man-
agement. In addition to detailed case study analysis, ongoing research explores socio-
economic aspects of these settings such as making on-shore wages endogenous to the 
labor supply and to MPA quality, incomplete labor and resource markets, and the role 
of alternative income-generating projects or conditional and non-conditional payments 
in inducing conservation. Similarly, analyses of different ecological settings in terms 
of dispersal patterns, of heterogeneity across marine sites including hotspots, and of 
ecological goals other than resource stocks will provide information for managers of 
these complex systems (Capitán et al. 2020; Albers et al. 2015, 2020). Further work on 
heterogeneous enforcement patterns and contrasting enforcement through “caught in the 
act” versus “caught with contraband” will also improve the efficiency of MPA manage-
ment. In addition, analysis of the optimal MPA decisions during a dynamic transition 
from degraded resources to a steady state resource will prove particularly important for 
the lower income country context in which complete moratoria on fishing presents a 
problematic policy tool in the presence of subsistence fishers, slack labor markets, and 
limited regulatory capacity.
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5.4.2  Contributions to Research and Planning Literatures
This research contributes directly to the fishery economics literature in several ways. 
First, the open access baseline and all MPA policy analyses here employ a novel spatially-
explicit model of individual fisher behavior that contains the micro-foundations of fishing 
site choice and fishing effort decisions in settings with distance costs and labor tradeoffs, 
and aggregates individual fishing decisions across all fishers in a spatial Nash equilibrium. 
While many models assume away heterogenous distance costs, enforcement costs, and 
labor allocation decisions, the modeling framework here is inclusive of artisanal fishing 
settings with such characteristics while being general to many other settings by varying 
parameters—such as setting wage, enforcement costs, or distance costs to zero. Second, the 
analysis of multi-site MPAs informs the fishery economics literature on MPAs as a fishery 
management tool in which enforcement operates as a deterrent to fishing while the size 
and configuration of the MPA influences dispersal to encourage fishing in particular sites. 
Third, considering income instead of the more common fishery profits (here equivalent to 
yield) broadens the impact of fishery economics because income is a useful metric in many 
settings; fishery profits does not generate the same MPA policy as income; and evaluating 
broader policies, such as those that link income-generating projects to MPA designation, 
requires addressing income and labor allocation decisions. This research also informs the 
systematic conservation planning literature by using economic analysis of the response to 
MPAs in defining optimal MPAs rather than addressing people’s needs separately, as is 
common in practice. Integrating people’s response into the MPA site selection increases 
economic efficiency, as does the emphasis here on the additional benefits created by the 
MPA rather than levels of benefits. In addition, this analysis identifies the importance 
of MPA design that reflects the reality of limited enforcement budgets and incomplete 
enforcement in many settings.
6  Conclusion
The model results here inform MPA design decisions—including size, location, and 
enforcement—over a for a range of goals in settings where villagers face labor allocation 
decisions and distance costs and where managers face limited enforcement budgets. We 
demonstrate explicitly how the response of villagers to an MPA policy influences the opti-
mal choice of the MPA. Yet few models—and few practical MPA siting and implemen-
tation procedures—consider those reactions at the point of selecting MPA sites. Overall, 
MPA siting and management decisions that do not reflect the equilibrium villager response 
to the MPA overestimate conservation benefits and establish inefficient MPAs, due to the 
misrepresentation of the villagers’ reaction to the MPA and its enforcement in terms of ille-
gal fishing, fishing site choices, and fishery exit.
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Appendix 1: Dispersal Matrix
In common with much of the marine economics literature, a fish metapopulation structure 
on a grid with density dispersal defines the biological and spatial setting. Here, we follow 
Sanchirico and Wilen (2001), Smith and Wilen (2003), and Albers et al. (2015) in charac-
terizing the fish dispersal in a patchy setting. Fish stock changes in each site occur through 
growth over time, harvest, and dispersal: 
where Xt is a vector of fish stocks in each location in time t , K is a vector of carrying 
capacities, G(Xt,K) is the net growth function, D is the dispersal matrix, and Ht is a vector 
of the sum of all fishers’ harvest in a location at time t . All vectors are 1 × IJ (i.e. the 
dimensions of the closed system are I × J ), and each element of Xt,K,Ht refers to a spe-
cific i × j site. The logistic growth function G
(
Xt,K
)
= gXt
(
1 −
Xt
K
)
 depicts the specific 
per-site growth with g indicating the intrinsic net growth rate.
The IJ × IJ dispersal matrix D operationalizes the dispersal process as a linear func-
tion of fish stocks and densities of all sites (Sanchirico and Wilen 2001). For example, in a 
three-site system with patches indexed {1, 2, 3} , the following dispersal matrix contains the 
information about dispersal across all possible combinations of the three patches:
This matrix implies that
Here, 
{
a1, a2, a3
}
 represent pairwise dispersal coefficients for each pair of sites. For 
example, a1 affects dispersal between sites 1 and 2. Each column of D sums to zero, which 
guarantees (mechanically) zero net dispersal.
For an I × J grid, we generalize an IJ × IJ dispersal matrix, where each element is 
dkl =
bkl
Kl
.17 In this paper, dispersal occurs between neighbors that share a boundary through 
rook contiguity and not across site corners as in queen-contiguity. Numerators bkl derive 
from a system-wide dispersal coefficient m ∈ [0, 1] , where
(6)Xt+1 = Xt + G
(
Xt,K
)
+ DXt − Ht
(7)DXt =
⎡⎢⎢⎣
d11 d12 d13
d21 d22 d23
d31 d32 d33
⎤⎥⎥⎦
⎡⎢⎢⎣
Xt1
Xt2
Xt3
⎤⎥⎥⎦ =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
a1
�
Xt2
K2
−
Xt1
K1
�
+ a2
�
Xt3
K3
−
Xt1
K1
�
a1
�
Xt1
K1
−
Xt2
K2
�
+ a3
�
Xt3
K3
−
Xt2
K2
�
a2
�
Xt1
K1
−
Xt3
K3
�
+ a3
�
Xt2
K2
−
Xt3
K3
�
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(8)D =
⎡⎢⎢⎣
d11 d12 d13
d21 d22 d23
d31 d32 d33
⎤⎥⎥⎦ =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
−(a1+a2)
K1
a1
K2
a2
K3
a1
K1
−(a1+a3)
K2
a3
K3
a2
K1
a3
K2
−(a2+a3)
K3
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦
(9)
b
kl
= 0, if k ≠ l and patches k and l are not neighbors
b
kl
=
m
휈
l
, if k ≠ l and patches k and l are neighbors,where 휈
l
is patch l�s total number of neighbors (i.e., 휈
l
= 2 for a corner patch)
b
ll
= −
∑
k≠l
b
kl
, constraining each column of D to sum to zero.
17 We use k and l as indices to avoid confusion with the I × J dimensions of the system. Here, i and j refer to 
the row and column of a given site; k and l index the site itself.
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These conditions ensure, respectively, that direct dispersal only occurs between contigu-
ous sites, that the same fish cannot disperse to multiple neighboring sites, and that the dis-
persal matrix maintains a constant aggregate fish stock.
Appendix 2: Description of Numerical Methods
We solve the villagers’ problem (i.e. optimize income) for each unique MPA policy defined 
by the combination of three policy parameters (i.e. size of the MPA, sites protected, and 
enforcement level). For a given set of policy parameters, this solution is characterized by 
three conditions: (1) stock in steady-state, (2) labor is optimally allocated, and (3) fishers 
are in a spatial Nash equilibrium. Finally, the output is villagers’ best response to each 
unique MPA.18
Figure  8 outlines the solution method; each box represents a Matlab script. The 
script managerProblem.m controls the execution of the code. First, we set all parameters 
(setParameters.m) and create the spatial setting (defineNeighbors.m, defineDispersal.m, 
and distanceFromVillage.m). Second, we define all possible MPA configurations that can 
be set given the parameters (in our case, with 2 rows and 3 columns, there are 64 different 
MPA configurations. See Fig. 9).
Third, we iterate over all 64 possible MPA configurations and 500 possible enforcement 
levels (from 0 to 1 with a step size of 0.002). Inside this nested loop (32,000 iterations) we 
call the script to solve the villager’s problem (fishersProblem.m).19 For a given set of policy 
parameters (i.e. iteration in the nested loop), we start by creating a vector with all possible 
spatial distributions of fishers (in our case, with 12 fishers, there are 18,564 distributions. 
See Fig. 10).
In the next step, we iterate over all the 18,564 spatial distributions of fishers and 
solve for the steady state and their optimal allocation of labor (getSteadyStateOptima.m, 
nlsSolver3.m, and steadyStateFunction.m).20 In the last step of the solution of the villag-
ers’ problem (given a set of policy parameters), we identify which of the solutions pre-
viously identified are a spatial Nash equilibrium (findNashEquilibrium.m). To do so, we 
discard all solutions in which any fisher has an incentive to move (getStartDeviations.m, 
getMoveDeviations.m, and getIndices.m). The resulting solutions (i.e. non-discarded solu-
tions) are then saved and used for the output of villagers’ best responses.
Appendix 3: No‑Dispersal and Equidistance Cases
The spatial setting of density-dispersal between sites and heterogeneous distance to fish-
ing sites forms a foundation for exploring optimal MPA decisions but examining settings 
without these spatial components further elucidates the interactions occurring within the 
spatial setting.
18 This solution method is implemented in Matlab R2017a and the output is analyzed using Stata 14.2.
19 Note that this nested loop covers all unique MPA policies defined by the three policy parameters (MPA 
location and size are joint).
20 We use the Newton-Rhapson algorithm to solve for the steady-state (i.e. X
t
= X
t−1).
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Dispersal
A model experiment with zero dispersal mimics a sedentary species case and demonstrates 
the impact of dispersal in determining fishing patterns and the optimal MPAs. The fishers 
and MPA managers make their decisions according to the model described above but the 
dispersal matrix, D, is set to zero, converting Eq. 6 to:
The stock dynamics of each fishing site now depend only on the growth and harvest in 
that particular site.
With zero dispersal and no MPA, two villagers choose to become wage specializers and the 
remaining 10 fishers spread out across space more than for the baseline (Fig. 11). Without dis-
persal, villagers must incur distance costs to access fish stocks directly because the fish do not 
disperse to nearer village sites. The resulting equilibrium maintains the agglomeration of fishers 
near the village due to the distance cost but the most distant site contains one fisher. In this context, 
the yield-maximizing manager optimally locates an MPA near the village with enough enforce-
ment to deter some fishing labor to reduce open access over-extraction yield losses, at all budgets. 
The income-maximizing manager always includes site 4 in MPAs, which induces one additional 
villager to exit fishing, and also selects the near village location at higher budgets to reduce over-
extraction there. Both the ASL-marinescape and the ASL-MPA manager aim to induce exit from 
fishing and complete deterrence of fishing where possible (Fig. 11). Across budgets and manager 
types, the no-dispersal case’s optimal MPAs contain fewer column two sites than the dispersal 
case because those locations cannot contribute to other sites through dispersal, which allows the 
enforcement-distance relationship to dominate the MPA location decisions. As in the baseline 
above, yield and income maximizing managers reach their optimal configuration and enforcement 
level at moderately low budgets, with illegal fishing optimal in the MPAs.
Homogenous Distance Costs
Despite fishers’ statements about the role of distance in choosing fishing sites, most of the 
MPA economics literature assumes either zero or homogenous distance costs. Here, setting 
X
t+1 = Xt + G
(
X
t
,K
)
−H
t
Fig. 8  Solution method
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Fig. 9  All possible MPA configurations
Fig. 10  All possible fishers’ distributions
Fig. 11  Optimal MPAs for no-dispersal case. The number in each of the six fishing sites in this figure 
depicts the number of villagers who fish in that site in equilibrium, while the number below the first column 
is the number of villagers who undertake no fishing and work for wage full-time
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all distance costs to the distance to the nearest site to the village in the baseline (1.75) as 
a new baseline elucidates the impact of the heterogeneity of distance costs (Fig. 12). The 
fishers’ income maximization problem remains the same, but the fishing site choice does 
not rely on differences in the labor time allocated to traveling to different sites but instead 
relies on the homogeneous distance cost, ld, and the labor constraint becomes:
That homogeneity often produces multiple equilibria in the spatial distributions of fish-
ers, especially mirror image equilibria, which we identify but do not explore further here.
With homogeneous distance costs at the baseline level and no MPA, no villager becomes 
a wage specializer (results vary with higher distance costs). Instead, villagers spread out 
evenly across sites because they face no trade-off between distance and stock effects. As 
in the heterogeneous distance baseline, in the no-MPA case here, the center column can 
support more fishing than the edge columns due to dispersal benefits from 3 rather than 
2 neighboring sites, which also permits more fishers. The income maximizing manager 
focuses MPAs on the center column to facilitate fishing near in the remaining columns. For 
the ASL marinescape maximizing manager there are multiple equilibria masked in non-
integers fishers and we do not attempt to explore it further. Eventually, both ASL-maximizer 
Ln ≥ lw,n + lf ,i,n + ld,n.
Fig. 12  Optimal MPAs for equidistance case. The number in each of the six fishing sites in this figure 
depicts the number of villagers who fish in that site in equilibrium, while the number below the first column 
is the number of villagers who undertake no fishing and work for wage full-time
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managers protect the complete marinescape when the budget is high enough. In general, 
fishers’ decisions reflect the lack of heterogeneous distance costs by spreading out across 
the marinescape while MPA managers’ choices focus on taking advantage of the center col-
umn’s dispersal role. Again, income and yield maximizing managers achieve their objective 
at moderate budgets, with the yield maximizing MPA containing optimal illegal fishing.
Overall
Removing either dispersal or heterogeneous distance costs from the marinescape setting 
leads to different optimal MPAs than the baseline and isolates the individual contribution 
of each aspect to the choice of MPA. Most economic MPA analyses consider only disper-
sal, which leads to MPA locations that focus on protecting sites that can contribute beyond 
the MPA through dispersal and to fishers spread evenly across the marinescape. Employing 
such an MPA in a setting of artisanal fishers that consider distance costs as part of labor 
allocation decisions may not achieve the desired outcomes as fishers tend to choose sites 
closer to the village rather than spreading out (Figs. 11 and 12).
Appendix 4: Distance‑Dependent Enforcement Costs
In the baseline, we implicitly assume a site-specific distance cost of 1 for all sites and cal-
culate the enforcement cost as21:
where mpai is 1 if site i is protected and 0 otherwise. Here we relax the assumption and 
find the optimal MPA when enforcement costs are higher farther away from the village. 
To make it comparable to the budgets explored in the baseline, we choose the enforcement 
costs to (1) be proportional to the distance from the site to the village and (2) have the same 
average cost of enforcement (across sites) as in the baseline (i.e. 1). We present the rela-
tionship between distance cost and distance from the village in Table 2.
Therefore, with “Distance cost” or “ costi ” as the site-specific distance cost (last column 
in Table 2), the enforcement costs are calculated as22:
cost = enf × wage × L ×
(
6∑
i=1
mpai × 1
)
= enf × wage × L × sizeMPA,
21 In the (Stata) code: gen double enf_costs = 1 * enf * wage * L * size_MPA.
22 In the (stata) code: 
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Finally, Fig. 13 shows the results. Comparing the ecological goals with the baseline con-
firms that the effect of having distance-dependent enforcement costs is to make enforcement 
easier close to the village. Because it is now easier to enforce near the village, the optimal 
MPAs, in general, shift towards the first site and, consequently, fishing there decreases.
Appendix 5: Optimal MPAs to Maximize Yield and ASL‑MPA
See Figs. 14, 15, 16 and 17.
cost = enf × wage × L ×
(
6∑
i=1
mpai × costi
)
Table 2  Site-specific distance 
costs Site Distance from village Distance cost
1 1.75 0.293917586
2 4.3661 0.733299183
3 8.1892 1.375399938
4 5.25 0.881752757
5 6.6002 1.10852277
6 9.5688 1.607107767
Fig. 13  Optimal MPA with distance-dependent enforcement costs
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Fig. 14  Optimal MPA to maximize yield. Each column represents a different budget level from 0 (i.e. open 
access) to unlimited. a Labor allocation per villager; the white bars represent time spent fishing, the gray 
bars represent time traveling, and the black bars represent time spent working on shore. b Total fishing 
labor per site and the number of villagers in each site. c The fish stock. In b, c, black bars represent sites 
within the MPA
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Appendix 6: Maximizing MPA Stock
The park effectiveness literature argues that the impact of policy—in this case a park—
derive not from the ecological benefits generated by the park but instead by the additional 
ecological benefits generated that would not have been generated without the establishment 
of the park. In contrast, some managers seek to maximize the ecological benefits rather 
than the additional ecological benefits. In the case here, a “MPA stock-maximizing man-
ager”23 seeks to maximize the stock in the MPA:
Such managers create different MPA networks than ASL-MPA managers (Fig. 18). At 
high enough budgets, both the MPA stock maximizing manager and the ASL-MPA man-
ager put the entire marinescape into the MPA system. At lower budgets, however, the MPA 
stock maximizing manager includes the whole marinescape in the MPA to “get credit” for 
all site’s stocks. In contrast, at those lower budgets, the ASL-MPA manager uses smaller 
MPA systems that permit higher levels of enforcement and more effectiveness at generat-
ing conservation; and typically emphasizes either MPA units with zero fishing or MPA 
configurations that encourage fishers to exit fishing. The MPA stock maximizing manager 
generates a fraction of the avoided stock loss benefits created by the ASL-MPA manager’s 
MPAs, with that fraction becoming large at high budgets (Figs. 18 and 19). In particular, 
this manager’s MPA creates 18.3, 33.9, 57.3, and 77.7 percent of the ASL-MPA’s optimal 
MPA at budgets 5, 15, 25, and 35, respectively. The focus on within-MPA stock also gener-
ates lower marinescape avoided stock loss than created by the ASL-marinescape’s MPAs, 
until large budgets (Fig. 19). These results demonstrate the missed conservation opportu-
nities that derive from decisions based on total stock size rather than on the conservation 
additionality created by the MPA.
max
S,휙
∑
i
si[Xi]
Fig. 15  Changes in size and configuration when maximizing yield with different budgets
23 A manager goal of maximizing the post-policy stock at the marinescape level is identical to the goal of 
maximizing the post-policy Avoided Stock Loss (ASL) at the marinescape level.
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Fig. 16  Optimal MPA to maximize avoided fish stock in the MPA. Each column represents a different 
budget level from 0 (i.e. open access) to unlimited. a Labor allocation per villager; the white bars represent 
time spent fishing, the gray bars represent time traveling, and the black bars represent time spent working 
on shore. b Total fishing labor per site and the number of villagers in each site. c The fish stock. In b, c, 
black bars represent sites within the MPA
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Fig. 17  Changes in size and configuration when maximizing ASL-MPA with different budgets. The gray 
sites are the optimal MPA sites for each budget level and the MPA size is the number of sites included in 
the MPA. Although the optimal enforcement level increases between budget levels reported here, this figure 
contains every MPA size and configuration, which vary discretely as budget increases
Optimal Siting, Sizing, and Enforcement of Marine Protected…
1 3
Appendix 7: Assuming Perfect Enforcement
See Figs. 20 and 21.
Note the distinction between (1) assuming perfect enforcement, and (2) assuming 
unlimited budget. In the case of the ASL-marinescape manager, the difference is not con-
sequential. However, with the income goal, if the manager is naïve assuming (2), the MPAs 
Fig. 18  Optimal MPAs for stock and ASL maximizers
Fig. 19  ASL marinescape outcome for different goals
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chosen lead to the outcomes in Fig. 21. In contrast, if the manager is naïve assuming (1), 
then the naïve optimal is open access (i.e. the manager does not protect anything because 
she thinks the protection would lead to complete deterrence. In that case, the right side of 
Fig. 20 would be replaced by Open access at all budget levels).
Naïve: 0 0 0
0 0 0
Budget Enforcement ASL marinescape ASL marinescape
Share of optimal 
outcome Enforcement Budget
1 0.032 11.5 5 2 1 5 3 1 0.90 8% 0.004 1
1 2 0 1 2 0
3 0.05 15.8 5 2 1 5 3 1 3.63 23% 0.016 3
1 2 0 1 2 0
5 0.082 19.7 5 2 1 5 3 1 5.93 30% 0.026 5
1 2 0 1 2 0
10 0.082 30.9 3 4 0 5 3 1 12.48 40% 0.054 10
2 1 0 1 2 0
15 0.22 47.3 7 0 0 5 3 1 19.23 41% 0.082 15
0 4 0 1 2 0
25 0.266 61.6 8 0 2 5 3 1 50.92 83% 0.138 25
0 0 1 1 2 0
Unprotected site
Protected site
# Number of fishers
Optimal result Actual result
Optimal policy Naïve policy
Fig. 20  Naïve ASL marinescape manager
Naïve: 4 2 1
2 0 1
Budget Enforcement Income Income
Share of optimal 
outcome Enforcement Budget
1 0.026 104.3 5 2 1 5 3 1 102.69 98.5% 0 1
1 2 0 1 2 0
3 0.038 104.3 5 2 1 5 3 1 102.69 98.4% 0 3
1 2 0 1 2 0
5 0.038 104.3 5 2 1 5 3 1 102.69 98.4% 0 5
1 2 0 1 2 0
10 0.038 104.3 5 2 1 5 2 1 104.00 99.7% 0.058 10
1 2 0 1 2 0
15 0.038 104.3 5 2 1 5 2 1 104.00 100% 0.058 15
1 2 0 1 2 0
25 0.204 104.5 4 2 1 4 2 1 104.45 100% 0.204 25
2 0 1 2 0 1
Unprotected site
Protected site
# Number of fishers
Optimal policy Naïve policy
Optimal result Actual result
Fig. 21  Naïve income manager
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